Metropolitan bus service contracts (MBSC): Thoughts on the next round by Hensher, David A. & Stanley, John
 I T L S 
 
 
 
WORKING PAPER 
ITLS-WP-10-02 
 
 
Metropolitan bus service 
contracts (MBSC): Thoughts 
on the next round 
 
 
By 
 
David A Hensher and John Stanley 
 
 
 
January 2010 
 
 
ISSN 1832-570X 
 
INSTITUTE of TRANSPORT and 
LOGISTICS STUDIES 
The Australian Key Centre in 
Transport and Logistics Management 
 
The University of Sydney 
Established under the Australian Research Council’s Key Centre Program.
NUMBER: Working Paper ITLS-WP-10-02 
TITLE: Metropolitan bus service contracts (MBSC): Thoughts on 
the next round1 
 
ABSTRACT: This paper revisits a number of themes that have played a crucial 
role in the debate on alternative contracting regimes for the 
provision and bus and coach services. We have selected seven 
crucial issues to reflect on: (i) contractual regimes (in particular 
negotiated performance based contracts linked to benchmarking 
and competitive tendering); (ii) contract completeness (focussing 
on ex ante and ex post elements and what can be improved 
within the context of current contracts); (iii) building trust 
through partnership; (iv) number of contract areas (emphasising 
the crucial demand-side objective); (v) tactical or system level 
planning for bus services; (vi) asset ownership; and (vii) 
margins. 
KEY WORDS: Bus contracts, trusting partnerships, margins, tendering, 
negotiation, performance based contracts, asset ownership 
 
AUTHORS: David A Hensher and John Stanley 
 
 
CONTACT: Institute of Transport and Logistics Studies (C37) 
The Australian Key Centre in Transport Management 
The University of Sydney   NSW   2006   Australia 
 
Telephone: +61 9351 0071 
Facsimile:  +61 9351 0088 
E-mail: itls@sydney.edu.au 
Internet: http://www.itls.sydney.edu.au 
 
DATE: January 2010 
 
 
 
 
1 We thank Stephen Lucas for his comments on an early draft. 
 
 
Metropolitan bus service contracts (MBSC): Thoughts on the next round 
Hensher & Stanley 
 
1 
1. Background 
Operators under contract to deliver bus services in Sydney are at various timing points in their 
initial contract since the introduction of the new service provision contracts, known as 
Metropolitan Bus Service Contracts (MBSCs). In the lead up to the signing of these contracts, 
there were many issues that needed resolution, in large part due to the inadequacy of the 1990 
Passenger Transport Act (and associated revisions). In particular, government wanted to 
refocus on the business of providing ‘continuity of service’ and ‘value for money’. To achieve 
this, government developed a contract regime that was extremely detailed in its prescription 
of what operators must do to comply with the terms of a contract (what we refer to as ex ante 
prescription). The excessive ex ante prescription on a very new contract left little room for ex 
post negotiation to resolve matters that would inevitably arise with overly prescriptive and yet 
inevitably incomplete contracts.  
As government commences its next round of deliberations with incumbent operators, it is 
useful to reflect on the effectiveness of the initial contract round and to suggest what might be 
a sensible way forward. A lot of new experiences are now with us to assist the next round 
deliberations. This short paper reflects on what we regard are key issues that should be central 
to ongoing deliberations, ensuring that we preserve the good features of the current 
contractual regime while improving where deficiencies have been identified.  
In drawing together the experiences in the field under MBSCs, we also draw on the extensive 
body of experience around the world with alternative contracting regimes, that is distilled 
every two years in the International Conference series on Competition and Ownership of Land 
Passenger Transport (known as the Thredbo Series1).  This Series is now in its 22nd year, 
having held 11 very influential meetings throughout the world. As convenor of the Thredbo 
series, the first author is well placed to distil the experiences around the world, and the second 
author is well placed as an active member of the Thredbo series, in particular as a workshop 
chair over the last 8 years as well as helping to guide the focus of the series. 
We have selected seven crucial issues to reflect on: (i) contractual regimes (in particular 
negotiated performance based contracts linked to benchmarking and competitive tendering); 
(ii) contract completeness (focussing on ex ante and ex post elements and what can be 
improved within the context of current contracts); (iii) building trust through partnership; (iv) 
number of contract areas (emphasising the crucial demand-side objective); (v) tactical or 
system level planning for bus services; (vi) asset ownership; and (vii) margins. 
It is important from the outset to be aware of a crucial challenge that regulators should 
recognise and advise on, namely given the focus on growing patronage,  ‘How much of 
patronage growth can be attributed to the specific contract design, and how much is due to 
other factors?’. The answer may well guide the contractual regime, and in particular highlight 
the importance of appropriate payable incentives. 
2. Contract regimes: The case for negotiation 
The broad objective(s) of government is to provide a good quality, integrated and 
continually improving transit service for a fair price, with reasonable return to operators 
that gives value for money under a regime of continuity and community obligation (update 
based on Hensher and Stanley 2008). 
                                                          
1 For more details, see http://www.thredbo.itls.usyd.edu.au/ 
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Australian bus contracts have been pioneers in the development of negotiated performance-
based contracts (NPBCs), founded on trusting partnerships, whereby contracts are re-
negotiated with existing operators, subject to meeting certain conditions.  Melbourne and 
more recently Sydney are examples of this approach2.  Wallis et al. (2009) review the 
Adelaide experience with three rounds of tendering and conclude that there is little to gain in 
terms of cost efficiency and quality enhancement by going to a fourth round of tendering.  
They argue that a move to NPBCs not only can reduce transactions costs (associated with 
tendering) but also offers the opportunity to work closely with efficient incumbents to grow 
trust and build patronage where possible (mindful of the realities of the market for public 
transport services). It also reduces the uncertainty associated with renewal through tendering 
where a very efficient incumbent operator can still lose the right to provide services. Under 
tendering, there is a real and observed risk of incumbents tending to not commit to longer 
term investment in the industry (both physical and human resources) where contract 
continuity is uncertain, even when all the boxes are ticked on performance. Tendering also 
has a negative impact on building and maintaining a trusting partnership (in addition to high 
transactions (including transitional) costs every time re-tendering is put in place). 
In very general terms, negotiation is the process through which parties perceive one or more 
incompatibilities between them, and work to find a mutually acceptable solution3. In contrast 
to competitive tendering, which is framed to determine the value of a product or service, 
negotiation is designed to create the value of the product or service. 
Provisions to guard against regulatory capture are critical in a negotiated performance-based 
contractual process. Australian experience suggests that, under NPBCs, transparency and 
accountability can be achieved if the following four conditions are in place: 
1. Performance benchmarking to ensure that operator performance is efficient and effective.  
This benchmarking needs to be subjected to independent verification.  Key performance 
indicators (KPIs) and the threat of competition (through tendering)4, in the event of 
inadequate performance, assists the maintenance of competitive pressure and efficient 
performance. 
2. An open book approach to costs, achieved through an independent auditor.  Operators 
whose costs appear to be high through this analysis must justify their numbers or face a 
cut in remuneration5.  Those whose costs appear low have the opportunity to argue for an 
increase. 
3. The appointment of a probity auditor to oversee the negotiation process. 
4. Public disclosure of the contract. 
                                                          
2 Melbourne started it in about 2002 with a focus at the tactical or system planning level. 
3 We would suggest that, where a body of expertise exists in an Association that operators belong to, that with permission from the 
operators, there is much to be gained by at least including such an Association where elements of negotiation are generic in scope. This 
has the supplementary benefit of accessing the expertise of consultants and saving costs which ultimately are met by government 
4 In a very real sense, negotiation and competitive tendering might be seen not as alternatives but as complements in a sequence 
(Ivanova-Stenzel and Kroger 2005), where the competitive tendering stage is only necessary where certain conditions are not satisfied 
within the negotiation stage and during the agreed service delivery period. This is consistent with the promotion in Hensher (2007) of 
negotiated PBCs, with competitive tendering invoked when a service provider fails to deliver under the agreed contract with reasonable 
notice. 
5 Under competitive tendering, it is less likely that operators see any obligations to reveal their cost structures, since government has 
awarded them a contract based on the offered price under competition. Thus the benchmarking and open book auditing under NPBCs 
provides a much better way to obtain detailed data on operator performance that can be used to benchmark in a very meaningful way, 
controlling for differences that are not under the control of the operator. 
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Australian experience across jurisdictions that tender and those that negotiate is that there is 
a tendency for cost convergence.  A number of operators who provide service under each 
regime have noted this trend.  
We want to reinforce the importance of benchmarking in order to deliver continuity of service 
and value for money under this model. This is designed to monitor and ensure efficiency and 
effectiveness through the life of a contract, and not just at the point of contract completion. 
Incentives built into a negotiated contract conditioned on market-linked benchmarks and the 
ultimate sanction of tendering if non-compliant, enable the incumbent operator to at least 
prove their worth initially and then, provided the regulator does their job, would deliver true 
value for money at minimum transaction cost, even after allowing for the regulatory costs that 
should be common to all regimes, be they competitive tendering or negotiation.  
There is a growing body of theoretical and empirical evidence to support the promotion of 
awarding mechanisms with formal and informal devices, aimed at economic efficiency and 
effectiveness through the life of the contract i.e., ex ante and ex post coordination. Building on 
growing arguments to support NPBCs instead of CT, Bajari et al. (2002) suggest that CT 
performs poorly when ‘projects’ are complex and contractual design is incomplete. Area-wide 
metropolitan bus contracts fit this circumstance. This literature argues that competitive 
tendering can stifle communication between buyers (i.e., the regulator) and sellers (i.e., the 
service provider), preventing the buyer from utilising the contractor’s expertise when 
designing the project (which could be a network in the public transport setting). Authors such 
as Yvrande-Billon (2007), drawing on the French experience, promote the case for greater 
emphasis on establishing a credible regulatory scheme able to govern the procurement of 
public services ex post, arguing that focusing on introducing market mechanisms via 
competitive tendering per se ex ante does not guarantee better value for money. Implicit in her 
arguments is the need to develop trusting partnerships and (incomplete) commercial 
contracts with unambiguous incentive and penalty structures throughout the life of a contract, 
with market mechanisms such as competitive tendering always present as a way forward 
when operators fail to comply under reasonable notice. 
This focus may well enable a greater emphasis on achieving social objectives in contrast to 
commercial objectives; some might say the tendering “paranoid” may have taken 
governments away from the real objectives of social obligation and maximising net social 
benefit per dollar of subsidy, as recognised by Preston (2007), to a disproportionate and over-
zealous focus on cost containment and reduction. We would argue that the key issue is not 
‘applying the wrong kind of competitive tender to the wrong market’ (Preston 2007), but the 
inappropriateness of any form of competitive tender where the transaction costs are so high as 
to nullify any financial gains at the expense of the relative neglect of broader social 
obligations, which place as much emphasis on benefits as on costs. The exception is typically 
a first round tender when moving from an historically entrenched publicly provided public 
transport service. The latter usually delivers huge windfall financial gains in the range 20-30 
percent (Hensher and Wallis 2005).  
3. Contract completeness: why trust is fundamental 
In the transport sector, many types of contracts exist. Some are very precise, and strive for 
completeness; others are very ‘light-weight’ and are incomplete. Bus and coach contracts, 
won through competitive tendering or negotiation, are typically incomplete in the sense of an 
inability to verify all the relevant obligations, as articulated through a set of deliverables (see 
Hensher 2007).  
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When a principal (i.e., the government) and an agent (i.e., the bus operator) decide to 
collaborate, they create a ‘contract interface’ to guide the transaction, the subject of the 
collaboration. To maximise the gains, the interface must be correctly designed. Desirably, the 
parties should be able to foresee all contingencies that might affect the contract, and be able to 
decide what they should do.  
Contracts, however, will never be complete in the sense that every single obligation is so clear 
that it can be written down ex ante. There is a huge body of literature that has studied the 
appropriate mix of ex ante (before contract is signed) and ex post (after contract is signed) 
contractual obligations. Incompleteness is a natural consequence of the bounded rationality of 
the parties, linked to service provision complexity, and is an important element of the case for 
negotiation. 
The risk of contract ambiguity (or lack of clarity) without adequate and effective mechanisms 
to resolve the ambiguity in a timely way after a contract is signed, has surfaced as a major 
issue for both government (‘the regulator’) and operator (or contract region service provider).  
In terms of the experiences with the NSW MBSC contracts over the period 2002 to 2008, 
research undertaken by Hensher (2009) presented an innovative analysis of operator 
perceptions of contract completeness and clarity, as rated before and after contract signing.  
To identify the extent of incompleteness and clarity across a sample of bus contracts, Hensher 
(2009) investigated the extent of discrepancy between the regulator and the operators’ 
perceived ‘understanding’ of contract obligations. Incompleteness and clarity are in one sense 
a matter of perception and interpretation, but are clearly major features of doing business, 
especially in ex post commitment to contract variations and accumulating transaction costs. 
Hensher (2009) also investigated the role of trust between regulator and the operators in 
minimizing the lack of clarity and in establishing an understanding of the true nature of 
contract completeness. He found a very low degree of contract clarity in respect of ‘incentives 
to improve performance and grow patronage’, ‘contract renewal procedures’, and ‘ad hoc 
claims’. There was, however, a high level of contract clarity on ‘maintenance of accreditation 
currency’, ‘obligations regarding bus maintenance within the contract’, ‘agreements and 
obligations in respect of rights of operators in adjacent locations in joint service provision 
(integrated networks)’, and ‘payment procedures’. Evidence from Europe also suggests that 
the greatest challenge in terms of ambiguity after a contract is signed is on the demand side 
with service planning, network design, and marketing.  
Hensher also investigated how successful the bus operation has been under the contract in 
addressing (or resolving) issues that have arisen during this first contract period. He found 
that the most successful issues that have been resolved through communication are: ‘contract 
renewal procedures’; ‘maintenance of accreditation currency’; and ‘contract end procedures’. 
The issues where success has been perceived as quite ineffective have been ‘depot upgrades 
and expansion’, ‘change events’, and ‘incentives to improve performance and grow 
patronage’. This evidence should be taken into account in the next round of negotiations. 
Overlaying all this evidence was a finding that, where operators reported a higher level of 
trust between themselves and the regulator, there was greater communication and quicker 
resolution of issues, saving money and time. 
We argue that attempts to burden the contract with complexity, instead of recognising 
sensible boundaries for an incomplete contract that allow for incompleteness and negotiation, 
is not a preferred strategy. Incompleteness and negotiation gives both parties the opportunity 
to suggest changes (or variations) that move towards efficient and effective delivery, in 
contrast to the often seen evidence that overly complex contracts lead to ambiguity in 
translation and operator focus on such compliance with a diminished interest in exercising a 
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commitment to continuous improvement in the service (through risk sharing outside of the 
contract). Such complexity may also result in budget blow out as a consequence of high 
transaction costs in ensuring compliance (especially if it ends up in court) and, depending on 
the bargaining base of each party, a risk of high outlays with little gain in service.  
Considerable management time can be consumed by such distractions, which remove the 
focus from system and service design and delivery.  Negotiation under incomplete contracts is 
relatively more transparent in that the defined variation is clarified during negotiation. 
4. Building trust through partnership 
Building an efficient and effective supply chain of stakeholders in public transit provision 
requires a foundation strong in trust, with its distinct commitment to cooperation and 
collaboration (Hensher and Stanley 2008). 
It is possible to build a quality trusting partnership with well defined commercial (contracted) 
obligations; however, the contracting process will always be incomplete in practice, and 
hence there is a need to recognise that the contribution of each party in a service delivery 
chain requires close cooperation and collaboration. Continuity of compliant contracts is one 
important way of ensuring this (Hensher and Stanley 2008). 
Where the government and operator(s) work in a trusting partnership, especially at the 
Tactical level, we expect the best outcomes to result.  This expectation partly reflects the 
shortage of skilled people and the associated need to draw on all available skills to the 
maximum extent possible wherever they are located.  It also reflects the expectation that if the 
government and operator are jointly focused on achieving common goals (patronage and 
related outcomes), rather than on watching each other, the best patronage outcomes are likely 
to follow.  This notion of a trusting partnership has evolved through the recent Thredbo 
conferences as being grounded in five Cs: 
1. common core objectives tied to public policy purposes; 
2. consistency of behaviour and direction; 
3. confidence in a partner’s capacity to deliver; 
4. respect for each other’s competencies; and, 
5. demonstrated commitment to good faith in making and keeping arrangements and in 
principled behaviour. 
The 5 C’s support Contract Clarity (before signing the contract), and Clarity of obligations 
once the contract is signed.  
Agreed and shared governance arrangements reflecting these principles are the glue to tie the 
principles together.  These governance arrangements would also need to include (for example) 
accountability and transparency provisions that guard against regulatory capture, financing 
arrangements and relationship management provisions.  The governance arrangements may be 
spelt out in a service contract, included in a document that supports the service contract and/or 
be part of an Authority/industry-wide agreement that sets out behavioural expectations for all 
individual contracted operators in a wide market (e.g., all bus operators within a metropolitan 
area).  
A trusting partnership is seen as particularly important because of the problems posed by 
incomplete contracts. A changing market environment makes the complete specification of 
contractual obligations extremely difficult.  Furthermore, much experience (e.g., in many 
contracts in the Netherlands, as reported by Bakker and van de Velde (2009), Dijkstra and 
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Verheijdt (2009) and Eerdmans et al. (2009)) suggests that a contractual focus on such detail 
discourages operator innovation and encourages an operational focus on cost cutting, to 
increase profits.   
The absence of trust will typically see the Authority seeking to fully specify a contract, to 
protect its interests.  This invites complex legal argument and a loss of focus on the main 
service delivery outcomes, while lawyers debate what the contract intended and what was 
delivered.  However, in a context of trust, backed by transparency and accountability, there is 
no need to fully specify requirements.  In a context where trust exists, the contract need only 
set down requirements that are clear, and then specify a process that will be used for making 
decisions in areas of uncertainty, as the contract develops.  This has been the approach taken 
in the Melbourne bus contracts, arguably the first international public transport service 
delivery contracts where a trusting partnership has been consciously pursued between 
purchaser and provider over a sustained period of (seven or so) years (Stanley 2009).   
Hensher (2009) in the context of contract experience over the period 2002-2008, showed that 
the building of trust “can contribute significantly in reducing the barriers to establishing a 
better appreciation of the degree of contract completeness, and clarity of contract specification 
and obligations”. The MBSC contracts were effective from 2004 onwards (depending on 
when they were signed). The evidence shows a strong positive link between the average level 
of trust per annum over the active contract period and perceived contract completeness after 
2004. Leading up to 2004 there was considerable distrust. The perceived degree of trust 
between the operator and the regulator was obtained from the following question (and 
presented in Figure 1):  
‘How would you describe the degree of trust that existed in previous years and today between 
your bus operation and the organization that has awarded you a contract to provide bus 
services? Use a scale of 1-100 where 100 = complete trust and 1 = no trust.’ 
Further analysis reported in Hensher (2009) shows definitively that when trust increases, the 
perception of completeness increases, which seems logical, supporting the strong gain in 
building a trusting partnership between operator and regulator (see Stanley and van de Velde 
2008, Stanley et al. 2007).  The empirical evidence confirms in a systematic way, this 
somewhat ‘obvious’ belief in trust as an important lever in the institutional reform of the land 
passenger transport sector. 
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Figure 1: The trust profile of nine MBSC operators (2002-2008) 
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Mellish and MacDonald (2009) point out how, in two recent rounds of bus contracting in New 
South Wales, there has been a substantial change in the relationship between purchaser and 
provider.  Metropolitan bus contracts were negotiated in a hostile environment, where the 
authors argue that the NSW Government was intent on substantially restructuring the bus 
industry and bus services, and on imposing its will on the contracting process.  Highly 
detailed and prescriptive contracts resulted but without a working operational performance 
regime.  One result has been confusion about relative roles and responsibilities, as discussed 
by Hensher (2009).  This situation has been compounded by Government failure to deliver on 
some key parts of its contribution to service outcomes, such as an integrated ticketing system, 
new network plans, improved information systems and a benchmarking regime (although the 
latter is well advanced for implementation in 2010).   
Partly as a response to the outcomes of the metropolitan negotiations, the more recent NSW 
regional bus service contracts have been negotiated between Government and the bus industry 
using a trusting partnership model.  Independent consultants have been used for key tasks that 
provide transparency and accountability and help assure value for money. This has led to 
much greater clarity about roles and responsibilities, and allowed operators to focus more 
strongly on service delivery, rather than simply on survival in a combative environment. 
The Melbourne contracts have embedded in them the idea of a relationship committee. At 
present this is not formally set up, but there is an on-going contract negotiation process with 
DOT and regular (weekly) meetings between the CEO of BusVic and the DOT’s Director of 
Bus Operations, which effectively delivers the same result as what would be achieved with a 
formal arrangement.  The strength of trust in Melbourne at present is such that neither party 
sees the need for a formal structure. In situations where trust and partnership is less strong, of 
relatively fluid, the formality of such a structure would enable the players to resolve issues 
before they become a problem 
5. Number of contract areas: fewer not necessarily better 
Is there such a thing as an optimal contract area size in a geographical sense in a predefined 
jurisdiction, such as a metropolitan area?  What criteria might one apply to decide on this? 
The answer should be influenced primarily by demand-side considerations such as network 
connectivity impacts (economies of scope through networks, integrated fares, etc) and the 
supply-side in terms of cost and service delivery efficiencies. It is not dissimilar to the 
arguments on the optimal number of firms in an industry.  
There are two issues (at least) to address: first, what likely changes in network service 
delivery are desired and can be achieved by amalgamating contract areas, that cannot be 
achieved by alternative strategies such as establishing network alliances (even incentive-based 
ones) or competitive tendering of cross-regional services within the existing contract area 
regime?; and, second, will such amalgamations lose the internal (to an operator) efficiencies 
that currently exist?  
In responding to how many contract areas are appropriate, Preston and van de Velde (2002) 
comment that the U-shaped subsidy profile detected over time in competitive tendering is in 
part due to excessive concentration or collusion.  The upping of prices in re-bids is becoming 
common (as observed in Europe and New Zealand in particular) as the number of bidders 
drops (as a result of fewer operators in the market).  This is not unrelated to the size of the 
contract area; fewer and hence larger contract areas tends to reduce the potential for rich 
benchmarking (‘yardstick competition’) and the opportunity to have operators who know the 
contract regime willing and able to take over in the event of non-compliance.  
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The trade-offs between network/demand economies and internal efficiency will depend on a 
number of structural and historically contingent characteristics, including such different 
aspects as urban development and operator culture (Carlquist 2002). This was certainly true in 
the Sydney context in the early 1990s when the NSW 1990 Passenger Transport Act was 
introduced. It defined a suite of 78 contract areas based primarily on incumbency (tantamount 
to grandfather rights). Since then the number of operators has been reduced (while the 
contract areas have been reduced to 15). New global operators have moved into Sydney (e.g., 
Comfort Del Gro from Singapore and Australia, Veolia and Transdev from France), looking 
for opportunities to expand in the Australian market. Where geographically adjacent operators 
have been willing to sell, in part due to pressures to sell from the large global operators, but 
also because of the perceived uncertainty of the new reforms, we have evidence of a growing 
number of service areas under one operator. Using 2008 data on the total cost per vehicle 
kilometre and fleet size (a proxy for size of the bus business), we find that 31 percent of the 
variation in cost per km can be explained by fleet size, with a higher cost as fleet size 
increases. On average, every 10 additional vehicles increases average cost per km by 7.23 
c/km. This suggests diseconomies of scale on the supply side. 
The arguments and evidence presented in Hensher (2003) suggest that the perceived gains 
from the reduction in the number of contract areas are likely to be illusory.  If the gains in 
network economies on the demand side are not sufficiently large to outweigh any likely loss 
of internal efficiency, there is no case for amalgamating contract areas. Given the major focus 
on local service provision, opportunities to deliver appropriate cross-regional and cross-
network services can be revealed and best promoted by alternative strategies. A more sensible 
strategy is to separate off a critical trunk network (e.g. the orbital SmartBus network in 
Melbourne) and agree for it to be tendered, with local service growth still ensuring operators 
can grow their business base. 
What is far more important than simply changing contract area size is the implementation of 
an integrated fares strategy as pivotal to promoting network public transport activity. This 
facilitates all modes and not just buses, and hence is far more important than playing with the 
physical boundaries of bus operations. There are far more transfers between bus and rail, 
where an integrated ticketing system is a prerequisite. We are a strong believer in an 
integrated ticketing system, because of the user simplicity and convenience benefits.  
Our experience in Australia and in many other countries (notably the UK and New Zealand) 
leads us to express concern about the monopoly impact of fewer and larger contract areas, 
especially where an operator controls more than one region. This is a worry given that the 
number of metropolitan operators in Australia is declining fast. 
In particular, the loss of the family business is noteworthy. Most family businesses have a 
strong connection to the communities that they operate in and give very good "value for 
money" in a variety of ways. They are certainly efficient and as they disappear the "NZ 
model" starts to emerge in Australia, where a few large operators carve up the country.  Is that 
what we want?  
 
Metropolitan bus service contracts (MBSC): Thoughts on the next round 
Hensher & Stanley 
 
9 
Table 1 Synthesis of key issues in determining optimal size of operator/contract area 
 
Theme Comments 
Density of route network and 
network economies 
• As it increases there is operational dependency on availability of 
fixed facilities (central depot, local terminal…) 
• Very high fixed costs of depots which require sharing of these 
costs  
• Presence of such high costs involves a trade between sharing 
costs over many more activities/services, risks of diseconomies 
of scale and elimination of potential competition (either leading 
to entry under deregulation or competitive tendering or 
competition for incentive payments under PBC) 
Route structure • The balance between degrees of hubbing ranging from hub-
dominated to more uniform distribution in urban area moves to 
latter as a continuous spatial diffusion of urban activities takes 
place. 
Demand complements • Attributes of individual services as demand complements means 
that a change in frequency (say) of one service affects the 
demand for another 
Internal efficiency • Delivering services under benchmarked best practice in respect 
of cost efficiency, cost effectiveness and service effectiveness 
 
6. Tactical level planning: the foundation for unleashing value 
for money 
Consideration of contract area boundaries is an important element in the wider issue of bus 
system design for service delivery, as part of the wider public transport network.  A key role 
of service level contracts is to provide a legal and commercial framework for delivering 
products (services) that have been determined as needed at a higher level, the Tactical or 
system planning level.  While there may be scope for an operator to innovate with services at 
a contract area level, in most cases service expectations are tightly specified as a key contract 
deliverable. 
System planning skills in public transport are in short supply internationally.  A key benefit of 
a trusting partnership between purchaser (government) and providers is the opportunity that 
this provides for both parties to draw on their expertise to help design the public transport 
(bus) system that will maximise value for money for the host community. Ultimate 
responsibility for system planning will remain with government, but bus operators can add 
considerable value to system planning, usually working through their industry Association, by 
bringing their accumulated knowledge and experience to the task, in a trusting partnership 
with government.  Melbourne, for example, has worked this way for most of this decade, with 
very substantial service and patronage improvements resulting. Contract design is then 
structured to maximise achievement of the system level intentions. 
The effort that is required to be jointly put in to system planning is a key way in which 
government and operators can build understanding of each others’ goals and expectations.  It 
is a vital part of relationship building, in which trust can be fostered while the importance of 
transparency and accountability is affirmed.  Future planning for bus service contracts in 
NSW should build on past gains and ensure that the Tactical (system) planning task is 
undertaken with strong input from bus operators, through BusNSW. 
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7. Asset ownership: should be with the operators 
The NSW government has used the ‘continuity of service’ objective as the reason underlying 
the decisions to have all new vehicles owned by government (although initially financed by 
the operator with an agreed payment and depreciation plan over 15 years). 
We have discussed the issue of ownership of assets in great detail in Hensher (2007). The 
issue that matters is the ability of the assets to be acquired and utilized in a way that is 
compatible with the overall objectives of service delivery. Capital assets in the form of buses 
are inputs that must be worked; however, how much work one can get out of the assets may 
be linked to how well that asset is managed (including maintenance), and what incentives are 
in place for the operator to be committed to get the very best out of the asset. If the terms of 
access to the vehicle are less attractive under a regime of government ownership than under 
operator ownership, then we must ask if this impacts on the extraction of value from the asset 
in the delivery of service.  
The two issues that matter are (i) is there a defensible link between ‘continuity of service’ and 
government ownership of buses? and (ii) what overall cost savings would be obtained if 
ownership returned to the operator. The Melbourne model under the new contracts signed in 
2009 retains asset ownership in the hands of the operator, with government having access 
rights to assure service continuity.  
Given recent evidence that there are a number of operators keen to buy other incumbent 
operators in Sydney (and indeed that is occurring at a faster rate than was anticipated), we do 
not believe that there will ever be a situation where a defaulting operator would result in loss 
of continuity of service. Indeed such an operator can be expected to make the existing assets 
available to an interim operator by an obligation in their contract, with the assets provided at 
an agreed market rental value. Access to assets by government in the event of high risks to 
service continuity, rather than ownership, is the key.  So we see issue (i) as a red herring. 
We find the issue of bus ownership strange since the assets that will be the main determinant 
of access by other operators are the depots. This could be resolved, however, through a clause 
in the contract similar for the buses, in the case of default. However in an environment of 
trust, the commitment to deliver is high and any sense of the operator defaulting will be 
minimised. There are operators waiting in the ‘shadow’ to buy in. There still is merit however 
in having relevant clauses in the next contract to protect both government and passengers in 
the unlikely event of default (which experience suggests has followed very quickly by another 
operator purchasing the business). In summary, operators should own the assets, to work them 
best, and that government should ensure it has rights of access to the assets via the contract in 
the event of poor performance/risks to continuity. 
In summary, the operator is best to own the assets, because they will ensure the best use is 
made from them (Hart and Moore, 1990).   
8. Margins 
In 2005 Hensher prepared a paper for the then Bus and Coach Association of NSW (now Bus 
NSW) which recommended that ‘The evidence on margins from comparable operations in 
other countries (predominantly the UK, NZ, Europe) and other States in Australia is that the 
EBIT:cost margin should fall within the range 11-13 percent.’ 
A crucial element of the argument was related to evidence from comparable settings for bus 
operators and the level of risk in the Sydney environment both having an influence on the 
opportunity cost of capital, and hence return on investment. The paper had a significant 
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influence on the margins agreed to by both government and operators. Each operator 
negotiated a margin, which remains confidential to the two parties. 
As operators enter the next round of contract negotiation, if that is how the government will 
procede, the issue of margins, should be revisited. The key issue is to see if there are any 
changes in the financial environment that may have altered the risk profile of relevance. A 
risk that may have to be rethought relates to the bus, now that some vehicles are owned by 
government. Although we might suggest a four percent downward adjustment in the margin if 
all assets (buses and depot) were owned by government, the situation in NSW would take 
many years before all buses are in the hands of government.  
The current situation of a ‘shandy’ of asset ownership should revert back to operators owning 
all assets and margins be recalculated on that basis, since the arguments that government 
ownership will ensure a ‘continuity of service’ (implying the opposite otherwise) are simply 
not valid. 
In summary, operators should get a fair return for effort, given the level of risk. There is a 
wide range of evidence around Australia on which this can now be based. In addition, 
international evidence on margins in bus service provision has not changed noticeably since 
the last inquiry in 2005. We suggest for Metropolitan Australia a 10 to 15 percent EBIT to 
turnover as an appropriate broad range.  The lower end is predominantly Queensland, and the 
higher end is predominantly those operators that are more market exposed. 13 to 15 percent is 
not an unreasonable range for Sydney. We would also support a funding model that is 
sufficiently dynamic in its recognition of the risks that are not under the control of the 
operator or government such as the Global Financial Crises which makes the continued use of 
the bond rate plus a small margin problematic. 
9. Conclusions 
A successful contractual setting must align with the following Strategic and Tactical Level 
Commitments. At the Strategic level, political support for public transport, a clear statement 
of the policy goals that the public transport system is to pursue and a whole-of-government 
(integrated) approach to the policy framework within which public transport system operates, 
will provide the ideal foundation for subsequent contracting.  Service providers operating 
within this framework should understand the policy goals and be fully committed to their 
achievement. 
The Tactical level needs to be supportive of the Strategic policy context and to provide a clear 
sense of direction for service development.  Clarity in, and agreement about, the relative roles 
and responsibilities between purchaser and provider at the tactical level is important.  These 
roles and responsibilities will depend on the context in the particular jurisdiction (e.g., 
patronage growth prospects and the government’s willingness to invest for service 
development), and may sometimes include the public transport acting as an industry (e.g., 
through an Industry Association).  A trusting partnership between the parties, whatever their 
specific roles and responsibilities, is thought likely to enhance performance, reflecting the 
growing focus on the importance of relationship management.  This focus leads to an 
emphasis on an even-handed contract. 
A trusting partnership between purchaser and provider at the Tactical level, which flows 
through to the contractual/operational level, is likely to improve service delivery outcomes, as 
compared to a relationship that lacks this trust.  The circumstances most likely to encourage a 
trusting partnership seem likely to be where the five C’s identified above are alive and well, 
the awarding mechanism is a negotiated performance-based contract, with suitable provisions 
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for accountability and transparency, and in a tendering regime, there is provision for possible 
contract roll-over, related to performance, and/or a long contractual term.   
The contractual environment must demonstrate transparency and accountability to the 
efficient achievement of the public policy purposes that provide the service foundation.  The 
contract itself should not be overly prescriptive, but should assure a fair commercial outcome, 
while sustaining performance pressure on both provider and purchaser.  Both parties should 
be judged on their performance, not just the provider, and must have the competencies to 
undertake their roles and responsibilities.  Key Performance Indicators against which 
performance is assessed should be SMART: Specific, Measureable, Achievable, the 
Responsibilty of the party being assessed, and Timely.  These indicators should be linked to 
performance consequences, which should include some possibilities of contract roll-over 
where the provider’s performance has been of a high order (even if the contract was let by 
competitive tender). 
These contexts provide room for the partnership to develop while reducing operator risk of 
loss of intellectual property to third parties (potential competitors) because of the trusting 
relationship with the purchaser. The contract should include a process for managing 
changes/variations, clear processes for managing poor performance and defaults (a cure 
regime, including termination provisions), and transitioning arrangements in the event that the 
service is subsequently to be provided by another operator. 
Greater clarity and greater completeness not only supports more effective contracting between 
a principal and an agent, but also ensures greater trust between the parties, which will 
reinforce effectiveness and reduce uncertainty in ex post negotiation to clarify obligations. 
This approach to greater dialogue will also ensure that established benchmarks, that entitle an 
operator to re-negotiation of a performance-based contract, will send the right signals to both 
operators and regulators that compliance and non-compliance are increasingly less 
ambiguous, and the terms of playing the field, are increasingly transparent and clear. 
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